












This paper presents original primary research on mortgage lending in New Haven, Connecticut 
in the early nineteenth century. It observes a shift in the market at 1837: lending institutions 
abruptly began to make significant volumes of mortgage loans to non-elite individuals with less 
wealth and social standing. Before 1837, these institutions primarily made loans to the city’s 
social and economic elite. The paper uses this shift as a case study in local financial 
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Financial institutions promote economic development. Empirical economic research has 
established that the presence of financial intermediaries leads to wealth creation.1 While theorists 
have long disputed whether financial institutions are a cause or effect of economic growth,2 the 
balance of the argument has tipped in favor of those recognizing a causal role for banks and 
other financial intermediaries.3 The last few centuries have borne out the wisdom of Alexander 
Hamilton: “[m]ost commercial nations have found it necessary to institute banks; and they have 
proved to be the happiest engines that ever were invented for advancing trade.”4 
Where these happy engines come from is much more of a mystery. A lively scholarly 
debate continues over which factors contribute, or are essential, to the creation of sound financial 
institutions.5 This debate is not merely academic: much of humanity lives without financial 
institutions or substantial economic development. If the current debate produces coherent 
                                                 
1 See Ross Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes, 46 J. MONETARY ECON. 31 
(2000); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998); 
Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. 717 (1993). 
2 Compare JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, 
CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1911) and JOHN HICKS, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC HISTORY (1969) 
with Robert E. Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MON. ECON. 3, 6 (1988) and JOAN 
ROBINSON, THE RATE OF INTEREST AND OTHER ESSAYS (1952). 
3 Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 
(1997) (reviewing the literature and concluding that “[a] growing body of work would push even most skeptics 
toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the 
growth process”) 
4 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (April 30, 1781), in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
342, 362 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Federal ed. 1904). 
5 See, e.g., Sambit Bhattacharyya, Political Origins of Financial Structure, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 979 (2013) (“In spite 
of growing policy interest on the role of financial structure in promoting development, very little is known about 
how different financial structures emerge and evolve.”). 
4 
 
accounts of how and why financial institutions form, these insights could inform legal and policy 
choices in the many jurisdictions seeking to promote economic development.6 
This paper seeks to make a narrow contribution to this broad debate. It examines the 
development of institutional mortgage lending in New Haven, Connecticut in the early 
nineteenth century. It focuses on this period and this market because, around 1837, new lending 
institutions appeared in New Haven and began to make a significant volume of mortgage loans 
to middle-class New Haven citizens.7 Prior to 1837, the city’s lending institutions primarily 
made mortgage loans to an elite segment of the city’s population. The speed of this shift, as well 
as New Haven’s documentation of mortgage lending in its Land Records office, make the city an 
attractive case study. Moreover, land and improvements to land constituted a huge portion of the 
nation’s wealth in this early period.8 Accordingly, mortgage lending was an important part of the 
financial system. The importance of accessible mortgage markets continues to the present-day. 
Modern development theorists have hailed the economic and social virtues of empowering 
holders of real assets to borrow against them.9 
In focusing on the development of a more broadly accessibly mortgage market in 
antebellum New Haven, this paper addresses two particular conversations within the wider 
debate over the origins of financial institutions. First, the economic and financial development of 
                                                 
6 See Stephen Haber et al., Political Institutions and Financial Development, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stephen Haber et al. eds., 2008) (offering different policy prescriptions based on 
whether the legal-origins or political-institutions view of financial institution development prevails). 
7 See infra Figure 1. 
8 See Robert E. Gallman, American Economic Growth Before the Civil War: The Testimony of the Capital Stock 
Estimates, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 79 (Robert E. 
Gallman & John J. Wallis eds., 1993). 
9 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (promoting land titling as a means to put the value of 
real assets to economic use through mortgage lending). But see Timothy Mitchell, The Work of Economics: How a 




the United States in the early nineteenth century has served as an important case study for how 
and why financial institutions emerge.10 The country’s enviably rapid expansion during this 
period is surely the primary reason for this sustained historical attention. But the early nineteenth 
century United States is also attractive because it was so diverse. Different regions walked 
different paths to economic development but shared some initial conditions, allowing scholars to 
compare the effects of regional policy choices while controlling for other factors like cultural and 
legal heritage.11 This paper makes a modest contribution to the literature on New England’s 
development.12 In particular, it offers New Haven’s mortgage experience after 1837 as an 
exception to the pattern of “insider lending” which prevailed throughout New England at the 
time.13 It also adds some nuance to the division of the early United States into separate regions. 
In New Haven’s case, the American West and national fiscal policy choices had important, 
possibly transformative, consequences—even in a very local market for mortgage loans. 
The second conversation this paper addresses concerns the role of legal and political 
institutions in the development of financial institutions. In the wider debate over the drivers of 
financial development, commentators have found it useful to delineate between theories that 
emphasize the legal origins of financial institutions and those that cast financial development as 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (2003); 
RICHARD SYLLA, THE AMERICAN CAPITALIST MARKET, 1846-1914: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1975); John Joseph Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, or: What Can the 
World Bank Learn from American History?, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 92 
(Stephen Haber et al. eds., 2008); John Joseph Wallis et al., The Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in 
Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 121 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994). 
11 See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF NATION BUILDING (2000); Hugh T. Rockoff, Varieties of Banking and 
Regional Economic Development in the United States, 1840-1860, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 160 (2013). 
12 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at ch. 4; NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL 
CONNECTIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND (1994); PETER J. COLEMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF RHODE ISLAND, 1790-1860 (1969). 
13 See LAMOREAUX, supra note 12. But see Ta-Chen Wang, Banks, Credit Markets, and Early American 
Development: A Case Study of Entry and Competition, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 438 (2008) (observing some decrease in 
insider lending in Plymouth County, Massachusetts in the late 1830s and early 1840s). 
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the result of politics and political institutions.14 While this paper considers possible legal origins 
for the 1837 shift, it ultimately sides with the political-institutions camp. In particular, it offers an 
account of how the Town Deposit Fund, a local body created by the direct political participation 
of New Haven’s citizens, may have contributed to the shift in the city’s mortgage market. Many 
political-institution accounts focus on the incentives and actions of governments at a higher 
level, considering, for instance, the incentives of state governments to regulate financial 
institutions.15 Hopefully, this study can add greater depth to the political-institutions perspective 
by providing a local example of political institutions shaping financial development. Given that 
New England, in particular, had a large number of small banks during the early nineteenth 
century,16 a more local perspective could be useful. 
Part I of this paper introduces the capital hierarchy model, a framework describing 
different sources of debt and equity capital in growing economies. It also presents two datasets 
documenting mortgage lending in New Haven between 1800 and 1844 and discusses the entry of 
new institutional lenders into the market around 1837. The remaining Parts of the paper explore 
this change and its context more fully. Part II examines mortgage lending in New Haven before 
1837. It considers where institutional mortgage lenders in New Haven before 1837 should be 
categorized in the capital hierarchy model, describing how banks primarily conducted “insider 
lending” though pre-existing social networks. Part II concludes by discussing mortgage lending 
                                                 
14 See Haber et al., supra note 6, at 1. Compare Thorsten Beck et al., Law and finance: Why Does Legal Origin 
Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003) with Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long 
Run Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steve Durlauf eds., 2005). 
15 See, e.g., Bhattacharyya, supra note 5; Stephen Haber, Political Institutions and Financial Development: Evidence 
from the Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (Haber et al eds., 2008); Richard Sylla, The Political Economy of Early U.S. Financial 
Development, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 60 (Haber et al. eds., 2008). 
16 See SYLLA, supra note 15, at 79 tbl.3.3; BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 87. Nationally charted banks, with the 




by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Part III looks at mortgage lending during and after 
1837. It first examines loans made by New Haven itself in 1837. Next, it discusses the rise of the 
New Haven Savings Bank in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Throughout, it documents key 
differences between the insider mortgages made before 1837 and the later mortgages made by 
the Town and the Savings Bank. Ultimately, Part III casts these post-1837 loans as occupying a 
higher wrung on the capital hierarchy, indicating a progression in New Haven’s financial 
development. Part IV proposes some theories for what caused this progression, introducing 
economic, legal, and sociopolitical accounts. In particular, Part IV argues that political 
participation by a broad range of New Haven residents in the creation of the Town Deposit Fund 
may have spurred more widespread mortgage lending by later private banking institutions. 
I. Capital Hierarchies and Mortgage Lending in Antebellum New Haven 
This Part introduces two foundations for this paper—one theoretical, the other empirical. 
Section A looks to economics and economic history for a theoretical understanding of the stages 
of financial development. These literatures propose a hierarchy of capital sources that can be 
used to describe changes in New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market. Sections B 
and C present the empirical foundation of this paper: two datasets constructed from primary 
research in the New Haven Land Records. The first, less detailed dataset, given in Section B, 
examines New Haven’s total mortgage market at several points in the early nineteenth century. 
The second, more detailed dataset, given in Section C, documents institutional mortgage lending 
in the city between 1800 and 1840. Both datasets confirm that New Haven’s mortgage market 
change significantly in the late 1830s, as institutional lenders began to lend in substantial 
volumes for the first time. 
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conditions of [informal external sources]. The bank solves the problem of finding 
borrowers and lenders because they each know to go to the bank to place their 
excess purchasing power or to borrow. . . . The bank has the responsibility for 
evaluating potential borrowers, and banks typically develop expertise or staffs to 
make these kinds of decisions.21 
The remainder of this paper uses Temin’s capital hierarchy as a conceptual framework for 
understanding the changes that took place in New Haven’s mortgage market in the late 1830s. In 
particular, it asks when and why “Row 3” lending—capital allocation through expertise—
appeared in New Haven. To answer these questions, it first maps the dominant sources of capital 
in New Haven’s mortgage market to accurately place mortgage lending within the capital 
hierarchy. The following Section presents the results of this investigation. 
B. Institutional versus Non-Institutional Lending in New Haven’s Mortgage Market 
To categorize New Haven’s mortgage market within Temin’s capital hierarchy, I 
constructed two datasets using the archives of the New Haven Land Records. Before introducing 
these datasets, some background on land records and mortgage law in early nineteenth century 
Connecticut may be useful. At the time, mortgages consisted of a promissory note or other 
instrument pledging repayment of a debt and an associated deed transferring ownership in real 
property to a mortgagee. As legal documents transferring title, these mortgage deeds were 
recorded in local land records. Most of them took the form of warranty deeds and, in New Haven 
at least, were recorded on standard warranty deed forms or using standard warranty deed 
language—the same forms and language used for warranty deeds transferring title upon sale. 
However, unlike warranty deeds transferring title upon sale, mortgage deeds contained (always 
handwritten) voiding provisions invalidating the deed if the associated promissory note was 
timely repaid. The language of these voiding provisions suggests that mortgage deeds transferred 
                                                 
21 Id. at 711. 
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title from mortgagors to mortgagees outright, with satisfactory repayment of a debt reversing the 
transfer. But, in legal terms, this was not the case. At the time, Connecticut courts subscribed to a 
lien theory of mortgages, meaning that mortgagees held only a security interest in a mortgaged 
property.22 Title remained in the mortgagor until a mortgagee obtained a foreclosure decree from 
a local Superior Court.23 Even the foreclosure decree did not transfer title to the mortgagee. It 
merely began a redemption period during which a mortgagor could make good on her debt and 
retain title to her land. Redemption periods varied depending on the foreclosure decree, but they 
appear to have lasted six months to a year.24 Only once this redemption period expired did a 
mortgage deed effectively transfer title from a borrower to a lender.25  
In New Haven, all recorded deeds are held in archives attached to the Town Clerk’s 
office. Assembling the mortgage deeds for a given period allows for reconstruction of the size 
and details of the city’s mortgage market at a certain time. The first dataset I constructed focuses 
on New Haven’s total mortgage market in the 1830s and 1840s. In particular, to determine where 
on the capital hierarchy antebellum New Haven’s mortgage market should be categorized, I 
reviewed every mortgage deed recorded in the archives for three six-month periods—the first six 
months of 1830, 1835, and 1844. The time periods were chosen partly to confirm that changes 
took place in the mortgage market around 1837. The six-month periods in 1830 and 1835 
                                                 
22 See Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 561 (1843) (“The mortgagee has merely a lien upon the property for the 
security of the debt.”) 
23 See Basset v. Mason, 18 Conn. 131 (1846).  
24 See, e.g., Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575, 578 (1846) (citing a February 1842 foreclosure decree “limiting the 
time of redemption . . . to the first Monday of September 1842”); Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 557 (1843) (citing 
a January 1842 decree of foreclosure limiting the time of redemption to the first Monday of July 1842); Avery v. 
Kellogg, 11 Conn. 562, 563 (1836) (citing a March 1833 decree of foreclosure limiting the time of redemption to the 
first Monday of January 1834). 
25 Connecticut mortgage law operated under a “strict foreclosure” regime, where land was transferred to the 
mortgagee even if its value exceeded the original debt. See Bassett v. Mason, 18 Conn. 131, 132 (1846). For more 
background on redemption periods and strict foreclosure proceedings, see generally GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 112-116 (7th ed. 2006). 
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establish a baseline for what the market looked like before 1837. The 1844 period was chosen to 
be representative of the city’s mortgage market post-1837. By the mid-1840s, the nation was 
emerging from the economic depression that began with the Panic of 1837. Accordingly, by 
1844, any structural changes to the mortgage market that occurred in the late 1830s should no 
longer be obscured by poor macroeconomic circumstances. To construct the dataset, I located the 
volumes in the archives that contain deeds for the relevant periods, noted whether each deed was 
a mortgage deed, and, if so, recorded whether the lender was a Row 3 financial intermediary or a 
Row 2 private individual (or groups of private individuals) and the amount of the mortgage. This 
process involved reviewing 2,172 individual deeds recorded in the Land Records.26 Table 2 




                                                 
26 Note that the dataset may nonetheless not include 100% of the mortgages for these periods. Deeds are organized 
into roughly three categories in the Land Records archives: warranty deeds printed on forms containing some basic 
warranty deed language, quitclaim deeds printed on forms containing some basic quitclaim deed language, and 
bespoke “manuscript” deeds that contained no printed form language. All of the deeds contain some individualized 
handwritten material. For instance, as previously mentioned, mortgage deeds were generally recorded on warranty 
deed forms with handwritten voiding provisions. But the manuscript deeds are entirely handwritten. They often 
continue for many pages and are generally used for explaining more exotic real estate transfers. For instance, many 
probate transfers are recorded in manuscript form. Most of the volumes in the Land Records archives contain 
warranty deeds or quitclaim deeds (or some combination of both). I reviewed all of the relevant warranty and 
quitclaim deed volumes for the first six months of 1830, 1835, and 1840. However, I did not review the manuscript 
volumes for these periods. Doing so would have required deciphering many hundreds of pages of handwritten early 
nineteenth century script.  Accordingly, the dataset may underestimate the total number of mortgages originated 
during this period. This underestimation should be minimal. One estimate of its magnitude comes from the database 
introduced in Section C, which contains detailed information on the hundreds of institutional mortgages originated 
from 1800 and 1844. Of the 174 mortgages originated by the New Haven Savings Bank during the period, only 6, or 
3.4%, were recorded in manuscript volumes. (Mortgage deeds in manuscript volumes originated by specific 
mortgagees can be located easily using the archives’ indexes.) Consistent with the unusual nature of many of the 
manuscript deeds, it appears, then, that mortgages were only rarely recorded in the manuscript volumes. Based on 
the proportion of New Haven Savings Bank mortgages appearing in manuscript form, it is probably safe to say that 




Table 2: Total Mortgage Lending in New Haven 
 
 
Table 2 displays several important trends in New Haven’s mortgage market. First, it confirms 
that the early nineteenth century was a period of dynamic growth. The town’s mortgage market 
grew by roughly two and a half times between 1830 and 1844, in terms of both the number of 
loans and the total amount lent. Second, the market share of institutional lenders abruptly 
increased in the late 1830s, from virtually 0% in 1830 and 1835 to 26% of the total amount 
loaned in 1844. In addition, although the number of mortgages made by non-institutional lenders 
increased by 27% between 1835 and 1844, the total dollar amount loaned by them barely 
changed, increasing only 3%. This pattern suggests that a structural shift took place in the New 
Haven mortgage market in the late 1830s: as the total amount of capital disbursed by Row 2 
mortgage lenders hit a ceiling, financial intermediaries and other Row 3 lenders appeared and 
began to provide another source of capital to borrowers. Moreover, although not shown in Table 
1, the average size of a non-institutional mortgage in the first six months of 1844 was $835, 
whereas the average institutional mortgage was $1,426.27 The relative sizes of institutional and 
non-institutional mortgages further support the view that New Haven’s mortgage market 
progressed up the capital hierarchy in the late 1830s. Because they could assemble larger 
                                                 
27 See Database of Total Mortgages (on file with author). 
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
Mortgages Originated by 
"Row 2" Individual Lenders 85 70,402$             137 141,256$        175 146,136$       
Mortgages Originated by 
"Row 3" Institutions 1 800$                   0 0 36 51,350$         




amounts of capital and pool risks, banks and other financial intermediaries may have been better 
equipped to make larger loans than private individuals. Overall, Table 1 and the data behind it 
indicate that the changes in New Haven’s mortgage market between 1835 and 1844 were 
different from the changes between 1830 and 1835. The changes between 1830 and 1835 were 
changes of degree: mortgage activity, although consistent in character, became more frequent. 
But the changes between 1835 and 1844 included a shift in sources of capital and the type of 
lending, as delineated in Temin’s capital hierarchy. 
This is not to say that financial intermediaries categorically replaced individual mortgage 
lenders after the late 1830s. By 1844, institutional lenders only constituted about a quarter of the 
mortgage market—although it is possible that this proportion increased as the New Haven 
Savings Bank and similar institutions grew. Regardless of the exact market shares of institutional 
and non-institutional lenders during the rest of the nineteenth century, informal external sources 
of capital, mainly private individuals, continued to play a significant role in New Haven’s 
mortgage market into the early twentieth century.28 Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, 
financial development does not require Row 3 financial intermediaries to drive informal Row 2 
lenders from the market. No economy progresses through the capital hierarchy in lockstep, 
leaving behind old sources of capital and definitively switching to new ones. Instead, different 
sources of capital coexist: even in highly advanced economies, there are roles for less 
sophisticated sources of capital.29 However, although informal external sources did continue to 
exist and, for a time, dominate New Haven’s mortgage market, the increased participation of 
                                                 
28 Lisa Marshall, New Haven’s Mortgage Markets in an Era of Urbanism (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at 
the New Haven Museum) (documenting the prevalence of mortgage lending between private individuals, including 
neighbors, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century New Haven). 
29 See Temin, supra note 18, at 712; Sirri & Tufano, supra note 17, at 99; Charles W. Calmoris, The Costs of 
Rejecting Universal Banking: American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914, in COORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION 257 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Daniel M. G. Raff eds., 1995). 
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financial intermediaries after 1837 was a permanent shift, with ostensibly profound economic 
consequences over a long period of time. For example, the New Haven Savings Bank, founded in 
1838 and responsible for the bulk of the institutional lending in the 1840s, remained active until 
2004, when it underwent a successful merger with two other regional banks.30 
The remainder of this paper sets aside the question of the relative magnitude of 
institutional versus non-institutional lending in New Haven. Instead, it focuses on why, when, 
and how the shift towards institutional lending occurred. It focuses on the shift itself, instead of 
documenting the extent of its ramifications, because a turn to Row 3 lending in a developing 
economy is an important but by no means inevitable step. Indeed, the social, legal, and economic 
forces responsible for such shifts are poorly understood. With this in mind, the following Section 
introduces the second dataset drawn from the Land Records. It presents the story of institutional 
lending in New Haven in much greater detail. 
C. Institutional Lending in New Haven: 1800 - 1844 
The dataset introduced in Section B does not provide much clarity on when exactly the shift 
in New Haven’s mortgage market occurred and what entities were responsible for it. To examine 
these issues more closely, I constructed a second dataset of the three hundred and fifty-five 
mortgages in New Haven originated by a state-chartered bank or the state or local government 
between 1800 and 1844. I began the dataset at 1800 and ended it at 1844 for several reasons. 
First, although the overall ratio between institutional and non-institutional lending given in Table 
1 for 1830 and 1835 are broadly representative of the period, the almost complete lack of 
institutional lending in 1830 and the total lack of it in 1835 are slightly anomalous. Financial 
                                                 




intermediaries did make some loans before the late 1830s. To understand institutional lending 
before 1837 and to see if institutional lending had ever been prevalent in New Haven in the early 
nineteenth century before 1837, I examined the earliest decades of the century as well. I 
continued the dataset through 1844 because, as mentioned above, by the mid-1840s the nation’s 
economy was emerging from the economic depression of the late 1830s. Although it may have 
been useful to continue the dataset further into the 1840s, the New Haven Savings Bank was 
making so many mortgages by 1845 that assembling data on later years became arduous. A less 
rigorous review of deeds through the end of the 1840s confirmed that the trends shown in the 
dataset continued throughout the decade. To construct the dataset, I used the archives’ indexes, 
which list the locations of deeds by grantor and grantee. For each mortgage originated by one of 
the seven state-chartered banks and two government entities active as mortgagees before 1844, I 
recorded the date of the mortgage, its amount, its term (if given), all mortgagors, and all 
mortgagees.31 Figures 1 and 2 present the results of this primary research, in terms of volume of 
mortgages originated by institutions and total amount lent:  
                                                 
31  I also coded the property description given in the mortgage based on whether it used an address, physical 
landmarks, neighbors’ holdings, or other more technical methods to describe the mortgaged property. Ultimately, I 
did not use this data in this paper, although most mortgages during the period described the property at issue with 































































































































































































































These graphs tell the story of Table 2 in greater detail: in the late 1830s and early 1840s, 
institutional lenders began to make more mortgages and lend out more money overall.32 But the 
shift was not as abrupt as Table 2 might make it seem. Institutional lenders were active, although 
erratically and at relatively low levels, before 1837. Moreover, the increase in institutional 
lending was not monotonic. After a flurry of loans in 1837, institutional lending fell back, 
although never to its pre-1837 levels, before picking up steam again in the early 1840s. Further 
analysis reveals that the 1837 peak was driven by a different lender than the bank driving the rise 
of institutional lending in the early 1840s. Figures 3 and 4 show institutional lending from 1800 
and 1844 broken by mortgagee. The first major institutional player in the New Haven mortgage 
market was actually the town government: 
                                                 
32 A third aspect of this same shift, which is harder to see in Figures 1 and 2, is that the average size of mortgages 
also decreased after 1837 because the volume of mortgages rose more rapidly than the total amounts loaned out. The 
































































New Haven Savings Bank Other Private Banks State of Connecticut Town of New Haven
20 
 
While the lending data presented in Figures 1-4 confirm that the city’s mortgage market 
underwent a shift from Row 2 to Row 3 of the capital hierarchy in the late 1830s, they raise 
several important questions. First, given that banks did make mortgage loans earlier in the 
nineteenth century, can the shift at 1837 be cast as a discrete step up the capital hierarchy? 
Second, given that two of the most active institutions in New Haven’s mortgage market were 
public entities, how did governmental activities shape the city’s financial development? Finally, 
why did the change happen when it did? Parts II, III, and IV address these questions. 
II. Mortgage Lending in New Haven Before 1837 
This Part examines institutional mortgage lending in New Haven before 1837. Section A 
discusses bank lending activity and considers where pre-1837 bank lending should be 
categorized within the capital hierarchy. In particular, it asks whether bank lending before 1837 
fits with the “insider lending” model of New England banking in the nineteenth century. Section 
B focuses on mortgage lending by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Although Temin’s 
hierarchy of capital only considers private sources of capital, Section B attempts to characterize 
the State’s lending as Row 2 or Row 3 based on how it located borrowers. Overall, both bank 
lenders and the State before 1837 are more appropriately categorized as Row 2 lenders because 
they relied on pre-existing social networks to allocate capital. 
A. Bank Lending Before 1837 
One difficulty with casting the shift in 1837 as a progression from Row 2 informal external 
lending to Row 3 financial intermediary lending is that financial intermediaries were active in the 
New Haven mortgage market prior to 1837. Early institutional lending complicates the claim that 
the increased participation by institutional lenders in the late 1830s should be seen as a 
straightforward step up the capital hierarchy. In particular, it suggests that the shift in 1837 was 
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more of an acceleration of existing Row 3 activity instead of a discrete transition from Row 2 to 
Row 3. 
However, categorizing early bank mortgages in New Haven as Row 3 activity would be 
an oversimplification, one that points out imprecisions in the traditional capital hierarchy model. 
The capital hierarchy model delineates different sources of capital on the theory that each source 
will pool and lend capital in different ways. For instance, as explained above, how lenders 
acquire and use information about borrowers is a key distinction between Row 2 and Row 3 
activities.33 The model, as stated by Temin and in Table 1, assumes that financial intermediaries 
in Row 3 will gather and use information in different ways than private individuals acting as 
informal external sources of capital in Row 2. But this assumption can break down if financial 
intermediaries behave in the same way as informal, individual lenders. When banks rely on the 
same pre-existing social and kinship networks to pool capital and make loans, their loans are 
more appropriately categorized under Row 2.  
In early nineteenth century New England, the prevailing pattern was, in fact, for banks to 
operate within pre-existing social and kinship networks instead of serving as genuine financial 
intermediaries that solved information problems using Row 3 methods.34 Naomi Lamoreaux has 
dubbed this phenomenon “insider lending” and has documented its dominance throughout New 
England in the nineteenth century.35 New England banks were often controlled by 
socioeconomically privileged families which would use the corporate form to accumulate capital 
and then direct funds to their own economic projects, making themselves the primary borrowers 
                                                 
33 See note 21 and accompanying text. 
34 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 91 (“Records from the period show that many, if not most, banks loaned 
predominantly to insiders.”); LAMOREAUX, supra note 12; Temin, supra note 18 at 711. 
35 See LAMOREAUX, supra note 12; Naomi Lamoreaux, Banks, Kinship, and Economic Development: The New 
England Case, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 647 (1986). 
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of their banks’ money. Lamoreaux argues that these insider banks were nonetheless “engines of 
economic development”36 for the region and thrived in part because they used social and kinship 
networks to gather information on borrowers and to disseminate information to investors: 
[I]t is important to realize that loans to outsiders might [have led] to heavy losses, 
because it was difficult during this period to obtain accurate information about the 
creditworthiness of strangers. Indeed, given the generally poor quality of 
information, the monitoring of insiders by insiders may actually have been less 
risky than extending credit to outsiders. 
. . .  
[I]nsider lending also gave investors important information about the contents of 
banks’ portfolios, thus solving [a] problem of asymmetric information . . . . 
Purchasers of bank stock knew that they were investing in the diversified 
enterprises of the particular group that controlled the bank, not in some 
anonymously diversified portfolio.37 
Within this system, the crucial source of information for borrowers and investors was not the 
institutional status and expertise of the financial intermediary, as the capital hierarchy model 
imagines in Row 3 lending activities. Instead, the pre-existing social network behind the bank 
provided the relevant information, as with informal external sources of capital in Row 2. This is 
not just a fine theoretical distinction: modern economic arrangements require financial systems 
with the expertise to efficiently evaluate and conduct business with strangers.38 If financial 
intermediaries are simply proxies for pre-existing social networks, they will be unable to sustain 
modern economic growth. 
So what of New Haven’s banks before 1837? Were they insider lenders, more 
appropriately placed at Row 2 of the capital hierarchy instead of Row 3? Despite Lamoreaux’s 
extensive research on insider lending, Connecticut banks do not make an appearance in her work. 
                                                 
36 LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, ch. 3. 
37 Id. at 79. 
38 See Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, Connections, and the 
Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 535 (2009). 
23 
 
Bodenhorn mentions some New Haven banks but also does not focus on Connecticut.39 
Examining New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market, then, allows for a chance to 
test the prevailing account of New England’s early banking system. The following Subsections 
consider the banks that made mortgage loans in the city prior to 1837.40 The overwhelming 
majority of these loans, about 87%, came from the New Haven Bank, and its origins and 
practices receive the most scrutiny. But other bank mortgagees are also discussed in Subsection 
I.B.2. Overall, New Haven’s pre-1837 bank mortgage market fits with the insider lending 
account of New England banking during this era: mortgage loans were made by institutions 
controlled by the city’s socioeconomic and business elite and for members of this same group. 
1. The New Haven Bank 
The New Haven Bank, New Haven’s oldest bank and the twelfth oldest bank in the 
United States,41 was born at the home of Thomas Atwater, a scion of one of New Haven’s most 
historically prominent families.42 New Haven residents gathered at a meeting there on February 
16th, 1792, to draft a petition to the Connecticut General Assembly to charter a bank in New 
Haven.43 The petition was approved later that year.44  
                                                 
39
 BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 72, 86. 
40 The city’s ill-fated first mutual savings bank, the Savings Bank of New Haven, made two mortgage loans during 
this period. Because of the later success of the New Haven Savings Bank, the city’s second mutual savings bank, 
these two mortgages and the short and unhappy life of the Savings Bank of New Haven are discussed in Section 
III.B instead of here. 
41 Sylla, supra note 15, at 78 tbl.3.2. 
42 WILLIAM F. HASSE, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN NEW HAVEN CONNECTICUT 5-6 (1946) (citing an advertisement in 
The Connecticut Journal on Feb. 15th 1792). 
43 Id. At the time, the legislature had to pass a specific act to create a banking corporation. In practice, however, this 
was not much of a barrier. New England had a de facto “free banking” system by the early nineteenth century—
meaning that state legislatures generally granted charters to just about anyone who petitioned for one. See Wallis, 
Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, supra note 10, at 111. 
44 See HASSE, supra note 42, at 6. 
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The New Haven Bank accumulated capital through sale of stock, which its Act of 
Incorporation set at two hundred dollars per share.45 The Act of Incorporation also established 
that the Bank would be led by a nine-person Board of Directors, voted into office by its 
shareholders.46 The Bank’s Directors not only controlled the Bank but also likely served as major 
sources of capital for it. Its Boards during the early nineteenth century were made up of the city’s 
social and business leaders: the annual results of its internal elections read like a who’s who list 
of New Haven’s patrician elite.47 Moreover, despite a provision in its Act of Incorporation 
requiring that “[n]ot more than three fourths of the directors in office, shall be eligible as 
directors the next succeeding year,”48 the Board’s membership was quite stable across the early 
nineteenth century.49 Many of the Bank’s Directors shared the same last name.50 
It is unsurprising that the oldest bank in New Haven would be helmed by the city’s 
elite—the composition of its borrowers is the real test of insider lending.51 Outright kinship 
bonds appear to have existed between the Bank’s Directors and its mortgagees in 28% of its 
mortgage loans before 1837.52 While this is on the low end of Lamoreaux’s examples, it still 
represents a significant portion of the Bank’s mortgage portfolio.53 Other details suggest that, 
                                                 
45 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AS REVISED AND ENACTED BY 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN MAY 1821 69 (1821), http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ 
MMLP?af=RN&ae=DT103919042&srchtp=a&ste=14. 
46 Id. at 69-70. Each Director had to be a shareholder of the Bank as well. 
47 See Record Books of the New Haven Bank (on file at the New Haven Museum). 
48 SWIFT, supra note 45 at 70. 
49 Record Books, supra note 47. Caleb Brintwall, for instance, left the Board in 1838, only to return in 1840.  
50 Id. For instance, Stephen Huggins was a Director in 1822; Henry Huggins was a Director in 1836. 
51 While the Bank conducted substantial non-mortgage activities, the present analysis is confined to its mortgage 
lending. 
52 I calculated this number by comparing the last names of pre-1837 mortgagees with the last names of Directors for 
this period. 11 out of the Bank’s 39 mortgages between 1800 and 1837 went to individuals who shared a surname 
with a past or future Director. This estimate may be conservative because loans to businesses were coded as non-
kinship loans, although kinship ties may have existed between business leaders or firms may have had interlocking 
Boards. 
53 While Lamoreaux reports examples in this neighborhood, she also finds instances of extremely high rates of 
insider lending. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 10, at 15-17, 16 n.13. However, in some of the highest cases she 
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even when Directors were not related by blood to the Bank’s mortgagees, its borrowers were 
drawn from a wealthy, sophisticated segment of New Haven society. First, the loans were 
relatively large, averaging $2,358 dollars, a large sum of money at the time.54 Because borrowers 
had to put up sufficient real estate to secure these large loans, most likely only members with 
considerable wealth and social status received them. Few residents of New Haven had “new 
brick dwelling houses” like the ones mortgaged by Ira Atwater and Addin Lewis in 1826 and 
1827.55 Second, the terms and structure of many of the loans were sophisticated, in that they 
varied loan-to-loan and could grow quite complex. For instance, the Bank made a bundle of 
loans worth $3,400 to Russell Hotchkiss and Walter Buddington in 1817, but secured them with 
a single piece of real estate.56 In addition, in contrast to many post-1837 institutional mortgages, 
the terms of the Bank’s mortgages were not standardized, suggesting that they resulted from 
specific negotiations between the Bank and savvy customers.57 In 1821, for example, the New 
                                                                                                                                                             
found, banks were controlled by specific families. For instance, up to 84% of one Rhode Island’s banks loans were 
to “three interrelated families that controlled the bank.” Id. at 16. The New Haven Bank does not seem to be so 
firmly under the control of a single kinship group. 
54 Database of Institutional Mortgages 1800-1844 (on file with author). 
55 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 444 (Aug 28, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 268 (Sept. 14, 1826); Mortgage 
Deed at Vol. 74, p. 276 (Oct. 4, 1826). 
56 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 66, p. 91 of Land Records (Sept. 30, 1817). 
57 By current standards, most of the mortgages in New Haven in the early nineteenth century were very short-term, 
many coming due in a matter of months. This is consistent with American antebellum banking more broadly. See 
BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 55 tbl. 3.1. However, renewals appear to have been common practice during this 
period as well, although there was substantially more regional variation in this respect. Id. at 56. Renewal rates in 
New Haven are unclear as few of the promissory notes associated with the mortgage deeds survive. However, a 
promissory note issued by the New Haven Savings Bank in 1843 that includes the actual repayment schedule of the 
loan suggests that banks were comfortable with renewals and that the short terms of some loans were not as harsh as 
they appeared: the borrower of the surviving note did not begin to make principal payments until 1851, despite the 
note being “payable on demand, for value received.” See Promissory Note between New Haven Savings Bank and 
unknown individual, October 6th, 1843, New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File # 76, Box 4, Folder A. 
Moreover, analysis of releases for some of the mortgages in this paper’s database suggest that many loans were not 
repaid on time or were renewed. This analysis is inconclusive, however, because the Land Records do not contain an 
associated release for every mortgage deed. It should also be noted that interest rates were largely set by usury laws 
during this period. The mortgage deeds do not contain interest rates for their associated loans, but, most likely, all of 
the loans were close to the legal limit of 6%. For an extended discussion of the effects of usury laws and interest 
rates in antebellum capital markets, including New England, see BODENHORN, supra note 11, ch. 4. 
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Haven Bank made four mortgages, none of which became payable on the same schedule.58 
Finally, several of the Bank’s loans were used to finance manufacturing activities, such as two 
mortgage loans totaling $7,000 to the New Haven Fontine Company in 1827 and 1828.59 
Manufacturing was not yet well-established in New Haven at the time and, while there were 
certainly failed manufacturing ventures, participation in early industry as an entrepreneur 
suggested above-average financial resources and social capital. In sum, then, the mortgage 
activities of the New Haven Bank and, by extension, most of the mortgage lending made in the 
town prior to 1837 were not accessible to individuals outside of the city’s socioeconomic elite. 
Although only 28% of the mortgage loans were prototypical examples of insider lending—loans 
where some kinship relationship existed between the borrower and the bank Board—other 
attributes of the loans place them within insider networks. 
2. Other Bank Lenders 
Few banks besides the New Haven Bank were active in the mortgage market before 
1837. However, loans made by these other banks appear to be even more embedded in pre-
existing social and economic arrangements. The only years with significant mortgage lending 
activity by other banks were 1812 and 1829.60 In 1812, the Bank of Bridgeport made a $15,000 
loan to Elisha Atwater, Ward Atwater, and Henry Daggett: the purpose of this loan is unclear, 
but its size and the involvement of the Bank of Bridgeport were anomalous.61 The Atwaters and 
Daggetts were socially prominent families within the New Haven community, and both were 
                                                 
58 See Mortgage Deed at Vol. 69, p. 116 of Land Records (Feb. 21, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 218 of Land 
Records (Dec. 11, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 317 of Land Records (Dec. 11, 1821); Mortgage Deed at 
Vol. 70, p. 322 of Land Records (Dec. 27, 1821).  
59 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 75, p. 103 of Land Records (Nov. 23, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 75, p. 171 of Land 
Records (July 18, 1828). 
60 See Figure 4 supra. Again, the two much smaller mortgages made by the Savings Banks of New Haven are not 
discussed here but are considered infra at Section II.A. 
61 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 60, p. 485 of the Land Records (Dec. 8, 1812). 
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represented on the Board of the New Haven Bank.62 In 1829, the Mechanics Bank of New 
Haven, which had been chartered in 1824 to finance the Farmington Canal, technically made a 
$26,328 mortgage loan to the Farmington Canal Company.63 The Company mortgaged basically 
the entire canal and threw in a wharf for good measure.64 The Mechanics Bank would eventually 
place $200,000 of its roughly $500,000 capital stock in ownership of the Farmington Canal 
Company; after the Canal failed, the bank had to write down this investment, a huge loss.65 
Because of the Bank’s significant ownership interest in the Canal, the Canal’s fraught history, 
and the significant assets transferred in the 1829 mortgage deed, it is not clear exactly how to 
interpret the canal mortgage—it was likely part of a larger, complex financing arrangement 
between the Mechanics Bank and the Farmington Canal Company. Regardless of the details of 
any such arrangement, it seems safe to cast the loans made by the Mechanics Bank and the Bank 
of Bridgeport as complicated, commercial mortgages that came out of pre-existing social and 
economic relationships. 
Overall, this Section’s examination of mortgage lending by banks in New Haven before 
1837 affirms the characterization of the later shift in the market as a step up the capital hierarchy, 
with the important caveat that banks can exist but nonetheless operate more like friends and 
family of borrowers than as impersonal financial intermediaries relying on expertise to interact 
with unknown economic actors. New Haven’s banks before 1837 were profoundly patrician and 
more representative of Row 2 of the capital hierarchy than Row 3. However, to fully judge the 
shift as a step up the hierarchy, it is necessary to establish that the loans after 1837 were not of 
the same patrician character. Part III undertakes this analysis. Before moving on to this question, 
                                                 
62 See Record Books supra note 47. 
63 HASSE, supra note 42 at 21; Mortgage Deed at Vol. 77, p. 437 of the Land Records (Aug. 13, 1829). 
64 Id. 
65 HASSE, supra note 42 at 22-23. 
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however, an important and largely unexplored historical wrinkle in New Haven’s financial 
development must be addressed: Section B considers the role of the State of Connecticut as an 
important mortgage lender in New Haven before 1837 
B. State Lending Before 1837 
The most significant difficulty with applying the capital hierarchy framework to the 
development of New Haven’s early nineteenth century mortgage market is that a substantial 
volume of loans in the city were made by economic actors that do not appear in the hierarchy—
state and local governments. In particular, before 1837, the State of Connecticut was the largest 
and most frequent mortgagee in the city after the New Haven Bank.66 Its method for pooling and 
disseminating capital, however, was starkly different from the other sources of capital given in 
Table 1. Although Sirri and Tufano briefly discuss economic pooling by governments, they do so 
primarily in the context of socialist and centrally planned economies,67 and Temin does not 
include pools of capital assembled by governments in the hierarchy of capital.68 However, it 
appears that government capital played a significant role in New Haven’s economic and financial 
development. Accordingly, this Section considers how the State pooled the capital used in its 
pre-1837 loans and how it solved information problems in choosing borrowers.  
The classic method by which governments pool capital is taxation. However, taxation is 
fundamentally redistributive: it uses the coercive power of the state to reallocate wealth within 
society. This was not the State of Connecticut’s project in making mortgage loans in the early 
nineteenth century. Even if the political will had existed for such an arrangement, there was not a 
                                                 
66 See supra Figures 3, 4. Database, supra note 54. The Town of New Haven also technically made five loans during 
this period, but their average size was barely $100, and they are not discussed here. 
67 See Sirri & Tufano, supra note 17 at 99. 
68 Temin, supra note 18, at 705. 
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great deal of wealth to reallocate so early on in the state’s development. Instead, the State’s 
mortgage lending activities were one way it injected into Connecticut’s economy a large pool of 
capital it had assembled outside of it—not through taxation, but conquest. Explaining the State’s 
capital pooling methods requires a digression through deep American history and, briefly, back 
to the Old World. 
In Connecticut’s original 1662 charter, King Charles II granted the colony 
all that Part of Our Dominions in New-England in America, . . . on the South by 
the Sea; and in Longitude as the Line of the Massachusetts-Colony, running from 
East to West, That is to say, From the said Narraganset-Bay on the East, to the 
South Sea on the West Part . . .69 
The “South Sea” referred to the Pacific Ocean, although, even from a European’s perspective, 
Charles could only grant the land up to the Mississippi River. Thus, the earliest version of 
Connecticut stretched westward in a long strip through present-day New York, Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Over time Connecticut’s claims to these lands conflicted with those 
of New Yorkers and “Pennamites,” residents of present-day Pennsylvania. At various points, 
disputes over the lands boiled over into armed conflict, although the “battles” of the Pennamite-
Yankee War were far from spectacular.70 In 1782, a Court of Commissioners appointed by the 
Continental Congress sided with the Pennamites, awarding the Wyoming River Valley to 
Pennsylvania.71 Apparently in recompense, when Connecticut ceded its other western claims to 
                                                 
69 CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ct03.asp. 
70 See Anne M. Ousterhout, Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley, 62 
PENN. HIST. 330 (1995). 




the Continental government in 1785, it was allowed to keep 3.3 million acres of its originally 
chartered territory, the so-called “Connecticut Western Reserve.”72  
In 1795, the State sold the Connecticut Western Reserve for $1.2 million, a huge pool of 
capital at the time, to a group of speculators operating as the Connecticut Land Company.73 
However, at the time of sale, neither the State, the federal government, nor any settler held clear 
title to the Reserve. Native Americans remained in possession of most of the lands into the early 
nineteenth century. The Supreme Court would not definitively settle the issue of Native title to 
Western lands until its 1823 Johnson v. M’Intosh decision, which danced around the reality of 
European armed conquest before finally stating that “the exclusive right of extinguishing the title 
which occupancy gave to [Native Americans] . . . . [has] been maintained and established as far 
west as the river Mississippi, by the sword.”74 The Connecticut Land Company began to survey 
and divide the Western Reserve into townships in 1796, claiming that it paid the Native 
Americans for their land as it did so—apparently giving them less than the $1.2 million it had 
already paid Connecticut.75 Native title may not have been legally extinguished until the Treaty 
of Fort Industry in 1805, which was the result of armed conflict.76 From one perspective, then, 
Connecticut got the money for its nineteenth century mortgages in New Haven through theft, in 
that it sold someone else’s land and then allowed the buyers to violently drive the original 
owners from the premises.  
                                                 
72 Deed of Cession of Land from Connecticut to the United States (1786), 
http://www.fold3.com/document/6603899/. 
73 See CLAUDE L. SHEPHARD, THE CONNECTICUT LAND COMPANY: A STUDY IN THE BEGINNINGS OF COLONIZATION 
OF THE WESTERN RESERVE 71-72 (1916), https://archive.org/stream/connecticutlandc00west#page/70/mode/2up. 
74 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). 
75 See SHEPHARD, supra note 73, at 74. 
76 See Treaty with Wyandot, July 4, 1805, 7 Stat. 87, in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 77-78 (Charles J. 
Kappler ed., 1904), http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/wya0077.htm. 
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 However the (il)legal details of Connecticut’s land sale are described, the State appears to 
have made prudent decisions with the proceeds. It created the Connecticut School Fund, which 
made loans and investments, including mortgages in cities like New Haven.77 By statute, “the 
nett amount of interest received yearly on said fund, [was] to be distributed, for the benefit of the 
public or common schools.”78 The School Fund is significant not only because it was an unusual 
mechanism of public finance but also because of the State’s active participation in the capital 
markets. Essentially, to fund one of North America’s earliest public school systems, the State of 
Connecticut functioned as a relatively large bank.79 The Fund’s existence also underscores one of 
the most important facts of early American history: the States, although largely industrially 
undeveloped by the end of the seventeenth century, were nonetheless wealthy in one crucial 
respect—land. 
 In practice, the School Fund operated as one of the nation’s earliest administrative 
agencies.80 It was headed by a Commissioner, who took the oath prescribed in the State 
Constitution for executive officers and was among the State’s highest paid salaried officials.81 
                                                 
77 See HARRIET TAYLOR UPTON & HARRY GARDNER CUTLER, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN RESERVE (1910). 
78 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund. Although the schools statute 
also provided for a general tax as a source of school financing, it stated that “whenever, in any year, the amount of 
interest arising from the school-fund, and to be divided to the school societies, shall exceed sixty-two thousand 
dollars, the amount of such excess shall, for said year, so far diminish the sum hereby appropriated, from the avails 
of the state tax.” Id. at Ch. I. Thus, the Fund was legally the primary source of funding for Connecticut’s first public 
schools. The size of the School Fund’s returns for this period are unclear, so the Fund’s interest may never have 
decreased the tax. However, it would have taken only slightly more than a five percent return on the Fund’s initial 
$1.2 million dollars to clear sixty-two thousand dollars in interest. Accordingly, the Fund may have been the 
primary source for school funding in practice as well as in theory. 
79 Unlike other banks of the period, however, the School Fund did not issue currency. Connecticut’s Upper House 
voted down a proposal to charter a true Bank of the State of Connecticut in 1806. See HASSE supra note 42 at 9-10.  
80 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 
(1996). Novak has claimed that the “first real administrative agencies in the United States” were state and local 
boards of health founded in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. While the School Fund Commissioner could not promulgate regulations to the extent of these boards, the 
other administrative attributes of the office suggest it may also be a contender for this distinction. 
81 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund; See SWIFT, supra note 45 at 
Title 83, An Act for regulating Salaries and Fees. The Commissioner was paid $1,000 a year from the Fund. It 
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The Commissioner apparently had real discretion, and neither the General Assembly nor the 
governor seem to have given specific guidance on which loans and investments were to be 
made.82 The Commissioner was constrained by a web of bureaucratic requirements, including 
registration of all the Fund’s investments and regular reporting to the state treasurer and 
comptroller.83 He was also authorized to hire a subordinate.84 The administrative attributes of the 
School Fund suggest that it could have operated as a Row 3 financial intermediary, building out 
a lending portfolio through expertise and institutional competence. 
 Before 1837, however, this was not the case: the School Fund’s borrowers were of the 
same profile as the New Haven Bank’s. The available evidence for the School Fund’s 
mortgagors is not as conclusive as the New Haven Bank’s, but, along each of the aspects 
discussed in the context of the Bank’s lending, except one, the State’s borrowers appear just as 
patrician. While calculating a rate of kinship relationships between individual borrowers and the 
State of Connecticut would be incoherent, many of the State’s pre-1837 borrowers are 
identifiably elite. Among others, they included Seth Staples, a founder of Yale Law School; 
James Hillhouse, a United States Senator; and James Brewster, a leading business magnate.85 In 
addition, the average size of the Fund’s pre-1837 mortgages was $2,355 (compared to $2,358 for 
the New Haven Bank’s), suggesting that borrowers had considerable wealth. While the record 
does not provide clear visibility on the purpose of these loans, several of them appear to have 
been related to business activities. For instance, John Calhoun mortgaged his factory lands in 
                                                                                                                                                             
appears the only state officials paid more were the justices of the Supreme Court of Errors, who were paid $1,100 
(for the chief justice) and $1,500 (for each associate justice). 
82 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 




1834.86 The only dimension along which the Fund’s pre-1837 mortgages do not align with the 
Bank’s is the variety and sophistication of their terms. The Fund’s mortgages were standardized; 
all of them contained essentially identical voiding clauses. These voiding clauses provided that 
interest would be paid annually on September 2nd and that every mortgage became payable on 
the September 2nd after it was made.87 These standardized components coincide with the 
reporting requirements of the Fund’s Commissioner under state statute: the Commissioner was 
required to deposit duplicate copies of accounting materials for the Fund in a vault in Hartford on 
September 2nd every year.88 The bureaucratic origins of the loans, then, appear to have affected 
their terms. In addition, all of the voiding clauses set out “penal sums” for which the borrower 
would be liable if his loan was not satisfactorily repaid.89 These penal sums were generally twice 
the principal of the mortgage. There is little evidence that these harsh terms were enforced to 
their legal extent.90 One likely explanation for their inclusion is that the State, or more accurately 
the Fund’s Commissioner, wanted to secure the maximum possible legal protections when 
loaning out public money. Given their origins, the standardized terms of the Fund’s mortgages 
are not inconsistent with the patrician borrower profile established by the loans’ other attributes. 
Overall, then, the School Fund appears to have located borrowers using the same pre-existing 
social and economic networks as the New Haven Bank. Despite being a public institution, the 
Fund loaned to the socioeconomic elite. 
                                                 
86 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 85, p. 145 of Land Records (May 30, 1834). It is not clear if this John Calhoun was related 
to (or even, in fact, was) John C. Calhoun, the Vice President and United States Senator. A graduate of Yale 
College, John C. Calhoun had many connections to New Haven, so this is a reasonable possibility. 
87 The Fund’s mortgages were, accordingly, short-term. See supra note 57 for an explanation of the short terms of 
antebellum loans. 
88 See SWIFT, supra note 45 at Title 84, Chapter II, An Act relating to the School-Fund. 
89 See, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 89, p. 54 of Land Records (Nov. 25, 1835). 
90 See supra note 57. 
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 In sum, this Part concludes that New Haven’s mortgage market before 1837 was 
characterized by large, often sophisticated loans to New Haven citizens with significant wealth 
and social status. To the extent that the lenders can be categorized within the capital hierarchy, 
they operated on Row 2, relying on insider networks to locate and evaluate borrowers. Even 
when the relevant capital pool cannot be placed inside the traditional capital hierarchy because 
the State assembled it, the funds flowed along the same channels. The next Part asks if this 
patrician mortgage market lasted and finds that it did not: bank mortgages soon became 
accessible to a wide range of non-elite New Haven residents.  
III. Mortgage Lending in New Haven During and After 1837 
This Part examines the New Haven mortgage market after 1837. It finds a profoundly 
different landscape from the pre-1837 market considered in Part I. In particular, after 1837, the 
most active bank, the New Haven Savings Bank, made loans to a broad population of residents 
and does not appear to have relied on pre-existing networks of wealth and social status to 
allocate its capital. However, the New Haven Savings Bank was not the first institution to lend 
outside of New Haven’s elite. In 1837, the year before the Savings Bank was chartered, the 
Town Deposit Fund, a local, public institution, made a significant volume of loans to a wide 
range of people. Section A documents the Town’s lending activities and the mortgage market in 
1837. Section B focuses on the New Haven Savings Bank and how it continued the 1837 shift 
into the 1840s and beyond. Based on the greater accessibility of the market and the interactions 
of later institutions with borrowers, the shift at 1837 can be characterized as a progression up the 





A. Mortgage Lending in New Haven in 1837: The Town Deposit Fund 
1837 was a big year in the New Haven mortgage market.91 Private banks made $37,100 
in mortgage loans. These loans were typical of pre-1837 private bank mortgages: there were only 
six of them, and their average size was $6,183. However, in the same year, another institution 
made five times as many loans as any private lender had previously made in a single year. This 
lender was not a bank, but the Town of New Haven itself. Because the Town abruptly made such 
a large volume of loans, this Section considers its funding sources and lending activities in detail. 
Like the State of Connecticut, the Town of New Haven cannot be located on the 
traditional capital hierarchy because it is a public institution. Also like the State, the Town did 
not use taxation to accumulate its capital but instead acquired a windfall through the sale of 
Western lands. However, the Town’s windfall, and the seizure of Native American lands that lay 
behind it, was filtered through several more layers of politics and history than the State’s. After 
the Eastern states ceded their Western holdings to the federal government, it began a long 
process of selling them to settlers and speculators. By 1836, the government had accumulated a 
substantial surplus through these sales.92 The question of what to do with the surplus generated 
significant political controversy, until Congress decided to divide it up and distribute it to the 
states.93  
In an early commitment to state-local federalism, Connecticut continued to divide and 
distribute the surplus funds downwards—into the hands of Connecticut towns. In 1836, it passed 
a statute creating “Town Deposit Funds” in each Connecticut town that wished to receive part of 
                                                 
91 See Figures 3 and 4 supra. 
92 See EDWARD G. BOURNE, THE HISTORY OF THE SURPLUS REVENUE OF 1837 BEING AN ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGINS, 
ITS DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE STATES, AND THE USES TO WHICH IT WAS APPLIED ch. 2 (1885). 
93 See id. at ch. 3; An Act to regulate the deposites of the public money, 5 Stat. 52 (1836). The statute required that 
the money eventually be paid back. 
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the surplus.94 These Funds were to make loans and investments, and the profits they earned were 
to go, in part, towards funding local school systems. 95 Essentially, when faced with another 
windfall from the sale of western lands, Connecticut created a set of miniature School Funds, 
each in its own municipality. Like the School Fund, the Town Deposit Funds were examples of 
active participation by early American government in the capital markets. This time, however, all 
levels of government, including federal and local, were involved: almost a century before the 
formation of Fannie Mae, the federal government’s money was already shaping the mortgage 
market in New Haven.96 
The statute creating the Town Deposit Funds also required towns to establish small 
administrative agencies to manage them: “[a]n agent or agents, appointed by each town at an 
annual town meeting, or at a special town meeting warned for that purpose, shall from time to 
time be the manager or managers of the fund belonging to their respective towns, and shall at 
their discretion make loans thereform.”97 In practice, then, the State actually devolved the surplus 
funds two levels down, skipping over mayors and existing local government structures to give 
authority over the money directly to townspeople in public meetings. While the Town Deposit 
Funds did not have the bureaucratic heft of the Connecticut School Fund, they did have two 
hallmarks of modern administrative agencies: discretion authorized by statute and additional 
legitimacy arising from direct public input.  
                                                 
94 SWIFT, supra note 45, An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States, 
Connecticut Statutes, Title XXXVI, Chapter II, § 7. Connecticut also required that the funds eventually be paid back 
and attached various conditions to their disbursal. 
95 Id. § 17. In an abundance of caution, § 18 of the Act authorizes the town’s to use any portion greater than half for 
schools. 
96 See Steagall National Housing Act of 1938, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1938). 
97 Id. § 13. 
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New Haven’s Town Deposit Fund began making mortgages early in 1837.98 Its loans, 
however, did not look like the pre-1837 bank or State mortgages. First, there were a lot of them: 
thirty-five in 1837 alone, almost as many as the New Haven Bank had made between 1800 and 
1837 in total. Second, they were small, averaging $814 (compared to $2,358 for the New Haven 
Bank and $2,355 for the State of Connecticut before 1837). None of the Town’s mortgages 
exceeded $1,000. Third, they were standardized, in part because the statute creating the Town 
Deposit Funds regulated the mortgages they could make. Every Town mortgage contained an 
essentially identical voiding clause, making the loan payable on the upcoming September 28th 
and requiring annual interest payments on September 28th, days before the October 1st date 
required by statute.99 However, the Town does not appear to have taken full advantage of these 
terms. I located release documents for nineteen of the Town mortgages; the average period 
between issuance of the loan and recorded release of obligations was seventy-nine months.100 
Finally, and most importantly, many of the borrowers from the Town Deposit Fund were 
identifiably not patrician. Determining the social status of the mortgagors is difficult, but New 
Haven began publishing a city-wide Directory in 1840.101 Many of the Town’s initial thirty-five 
borrowers are listed there, although not all. Appendix A provides the Directory information for 
                                                 
98 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 92, p. 472 of Land Records (Jan. 26, 1837). 
99 SWIFT, supra note 45, An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States, 
Connecticut Statutes, Title XXXVI, Chapter II, § 13. The statute also required that each loan be secured by real 
estate worth twice the value of the loan. 
100 See Database, supra note 54. See generally supra note 57 (providing background on terms and renewal rates in 
antebellum lending markets). To locate the release documents, I searched later archive indexes for deeds listing the 
Town of New Haven as grantor and, by comparing names of grantees, amounts of mortgages, or dates, was able to 
match release documents (usually quitclaim deeds) to original mortgages. These data suggest that the Town did not 
always enforce the legal terms of its mortgages to the fullest extent and, indeed, was quite lenient with renewals and 
repayments schedules. However, this conclusion is tentative. It is possible that quitclaim deeds for some of the 
mortgages were recorded much later than when an associated loan was repaid: mortgagors may have needed to 
demonstrate clear title for a later sale and requested that the bank record release documentation. This would explain 
why release documents were recorded for only some mortgages. Promissory notes would provide better evidence of 
repayment practices. However, very few promissory notes from the period survive. 
101 See CITY DIRECTORY OF NEW HAVEN (1840) (available at the New Haven Museum). 
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each borrower in full. The list includes several joiners (carpenters), a blacksmith, a shoemaker, 
and other middle-class occupations. The list is not universally middle-class: a few manufacturers, 
a state senator, and a sheriff appear. But the leading social and business lights of New Haven are 
not present. The Town’s loans went to a more diverse crowd with less wealth and lower social 
standing. 
It is not clear why the Town Deposit loans went to this group of people. Several different 
economic explanations are possible. First, because the private banks were also active in 1837, 
there may not have been patrician demand for loans from the Fund. However, the first private 
bank mortgage that year was not made until April 22, 1837, by which point the Town had 
already made twenty mortgages.102 Second, 1837 was a tough year economically: the Panic of 
1837 began in the spring and plunged the nation into a severe depression.103 The Town Deposit 
Fund may have been providing some financial relief to New Haven townspeople. Buried within 
this second economic explanation, though, is a political one: the idea that the Fund would help 
out average townspeople implies that they had some way to translate their economic hardships 
into action by the Fund. The statute that created the Fund supplied such a mechanism: the people 
of New Haven controlled the Fund through an agent they appointed at a town meeting. 
Regardless of the wider economic circumstances, then, the best account of why the Fund began 
lending to ordinary folks may be simply that state law put them in charge of the money. 
In any case, the mortgage lending activities of the Town Deposit Fund did not last long. 
After 1837, the Town made only seven more mortgages, although they were typical of the 1837 
loans in their size, terms, and the identities of the borrowers. The withdrawal of the Town from 
                                                 
102 Mortgage Deed at Vol. 92, p. 495 of Land Records (April 11, 1837). 




the market is not mysterious: the surplus funds were limited and, under the Connecticut and 
federal statutes, eventually had to be repaid. However, although the particular lending activities 
of the Town did not continue, the practice of making small, standardized loans to a 
socioeconomically diverse range of residents in New Haven did. A private bank founded in 1838 
would carry these practices forward, into the 1840s and beyond. The following Section examines 
the rise of this institution, the New Haven Savings Bank, in detail.  
B. Mortgage Lending After 1837: The Rise of the New Haven Savings Bank 
Institutional mortgage lending after 1837 is primarily a story of the New Haven Savings 
Bank. In every year after it was founded in 1838, until at least 1845, it made a greater number of 
mortgage loans and lent more in total than all other private banks in New Haven combined. 
Indeed, the other banks largely abandoned the mortgage market after 1837, making only five 
more loans through the end of 1844. In that time, the New Haven Savings Bank made one 
hundred and sixty-nine mortgages, rapidly establishing itself as a force in the New Haven 
mortgage market. This Section explores the origins and practices of the New Haven Savings 
Bank and concludes that it was the city’s first genuine Row 3 financial intermediary, one that 
primarily relied on expertise and institutional competence instead of pre-existing social and 
economic networks to pool and allocate capital. 
Unlike most other private institutional mortgage lenders in New Haven, the New Haven 
Savings Bank was a mutual savings bank rather than a full-service bank. In practice, this boils 
down to two key differences. First, the New Haven Savings Bank did not issue currency like 
other banks of the period. A national currency would not emerge until the 1860s, and a key 
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function of banks in the early nineteenth century was to provide paper money.104 The fact that 
there were no New Haven Savings Bank banknotes in circulation does not have many 
consequences for its participation in the mortgage market. The second and more important 
difference is that the New Haven Savings Bank pooled capital through deposits instead of 
primarily sales of bank stock.105 This meant that it pooled capital from a much broader and 
socioeconomically diverse set of private wealth holders than other banks. Recall that, under its 
Act of Incorporation, a share of New Haven Bank stock cost $200, more than many of the 
individual mortgages issued by the New Haven Savings Bank.106 In contrast, the New Haven 
Savings Bank took any deposit of one dollar or greater.107 Indeed, the Savings Bank’s cheerful 
yellow passbooks from the period, where account holders recorded deposits and dividend 
payments, were explicitly targeted at upwardly mobile depositors who had dreams of acquiring 
wealth but were not there yet. Adorned with a large image of a beehive, a symbol of industry, the 
passbooks contained a Remarks section explaining that  
[t]he New Haven Savings Bank has been established for the purpose of affording 
a secure investment for persons who have not the facilities of safely putting their 
income otherwise to use. . . . By the habit of saving in small matters, riches are 
frequently acquired. . . . Many instances are known of persons beginning the 
world without anything, who have become rich by their own industry and 
frugality. 
. . . 
The Savings Bank will be particularly useful to . . . persons who come in 
possession of money received by way of wages, gifts, or gratuities . . . . 108 
                                                 
104 See An Act to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the 
circulation and redemption thereof, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1864). 
105 For a discussion of deposit-taking in nineteenth century New England and “[d]irectors’ preference for stock 
issues over deposits,” see LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, at 65-70. 
106 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
107 New Haven Savings Bank Passbook, on file at New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File #76, Box 1, 




Materials like the Savings Bank’s passbooks are quintessential attributes of Row 3 
financial intermediaries. The Savings Bank did not accumulate capital through existing social 
and kinship networks, bundling together the wealth of high-status individuals who already knew 
each other. Instead, the Savings Bank targeted essentially anonymous people and convinced 
them to part with their money by advertising its institutional competence and expertise. These 
Row 3 strategies appear to have been effective. Founded in May 1838, the Bank had collected 
$6,559.11 in deposits by October 1838.109 By 1840, less than two years into its existence, the 
Savings Bank had 600 depositors in a town of around 14,000 people.110 
 It would be tempting to settle on the deposit structure of the Savings Bank as the reason it 
made loans to a more socioeconomically diverse set of borrowers. From this perspective, the 
whole shift in New Haven’s mortgage market could be reduced to an innovation in capital 
pooling that subsequently opened the institutional lending market to a new class of mortgagors. 
However, there is a glaring counterexample to this theory. The New Haven Savings Bank was 
not actually the first primarily deposit-taking, mutual savings bank in New Haven: the earlier and 
confusingly similarly named Savings Bank of New Haven (SBNH) was chartered in 1820. The 
SBNH pooled capital and functioned more or less identically to the later New Haven Savings 
Bank—all the way down to the colorful passbooks, although the SBNH’s were pink and had a 
reassuring quote from Benjamin Franklin on their cover instead of a beehive.111 The SBNH was 
also successful at attracting depositors. Hasse quotes from the minutes of the SBNH’s first 
annual meeting that “255 persons in 10 months have made 401 deposits in the amount of $23, 
                                                 
109 Id.; See Letter from William Hooker to Henry Kilbourn, Oct. 9, 1836, on file at the New Haven Historical 
Society, Manuscript File # 76, Box 1, Folder K. 
110 See HASSE, supra note 42, at 30. 
111 Compare Passbook, supra note 107 with Savings Bank of New Haven, Passbook No. 240, belonging to Sally 
Gillet, Inside Front Cover, New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76 Box 1, Folder L. The front cover of an SBNH 
passbook is included at Appendix B. 
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199.”112 By the mid-1820s, the SBNH had over one thousand depositors.113 Although it 
accumulated capital from a socially diverse range of individuals in New Haven, the SBNH did 
not lend to a wide range of them. Indeed, it made only two mortgages during its existence.114 
Most of the SBNH’s capital went into the Eagle Bank, New Haven’s second bank, founded in 
1811.115 The Eagle Bank appears to have been fully of the patrician mold of the New Haven 
Bank, although much less successful.116 It failed in 1825, “giving New Haven its first real 
financial panic” and dragging the SBNH down with it.117 The SBNH managed to pay back its 
depositors, with modest interest, by 1832, but it also officially shut its doors in 1825.118 The 
unhappy details of New Haven’s first bank crisis are largely beside the point here. The lesson of 
the SBNH is that accumulating deposits from a wide range of individuals did not imply that a 
bank would lend to them or that it would be beyond the control of the financial elite.119 
The later New Haven Savings Bank was no exception to this latter point. Although it 
accepted deposits from a socioeconomically diverse set of people, it remained firmly under the 
                                                 
112 HASSE, supra note 42, at 17 (quoting minutes of SBNH meeting). 
113 Savings Bank of New Haven, Passbook No. 1010, New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76, Box 1, Folder L. 
114 See Mortgage Deed at Vol, 76, p. 136 of Land Records (Jan. 29, 1828); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 78, p. 229 of 
Land Records (Nov. 16, 1830). 
115 See HASSE, supra note 42, at 10, 16-17. The two institutions shared Presidents. For more background, see 
generally the facts of Savings Bank of New Haven v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191 (Conn. 1830); Homer v. Savings Bank of 
New Haven, 7 Conn. 478 (Conn. 1829); Savings Bank of New Haven v. Bates, 8 Conn. 505 (Conn. 1831); and Catlin 
v. Savings Bank of New Haven, 7 Conn. 487 (Conn. 1829). All of these cases concerned the affairs of the Eagle 
Bank, but the NHSB was the captioned party in them. 
116 Its President was elected Mayor in 1822, in the middle of an era where patrician professionals controlled the 
office. See ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY tbl.2.1 (1961). In 
addition, an accounting of the Eagle Bank’s holdings on its demise shows that it operated as a typical bank during 
the period. See Report of Investigators of Eagle Bank (Oct. 25, 1825) (on file at the New Haven Museum, 
Manuscript File #76, Box 1, Folder C). 
117 See HASSE, supra note 42, at 13, 17. 
118 Id. Hasse reports that depositors received $1.11 for every dollar deposited by the end of 1832. My own 
calculations based on the passbooks on file at the New Haven museum put the number closer to $1.20. 
119 See also Lance Edwin Davis & Peter Lester Payne, From Benevolence to Business: The Story of Two Savings 




control of New Haven’s elite. As of 1840, it had a President, 4 Vice Presidents, and 9 trustees.120 
Of these 14 men, half either served on the Board of the New Haven Bank or shared a last name 
with someone who did. Of the remaining 7, 4 had borrowed money from the New Haven Bank at 
some point before 1837, including James Brewster, one of New Haven’s earliest industrial 
magnates. The final 3 included Ralph Ingersoll, a United States Congressman, and Roger 
Sherman, an apparently direct descendant of the more famous Roger Sherman, a Founding 
Father and New Haven’s first mayor. The only Trustee that did not have easily identifiable 
patrician bona fides is Henry White. But given his compatriots among the Savings Bank’s 
management, it is doubtful he was a “person who [began] the world without anything.”121 In 
addition, the New Haven Savings Bank was housed for many years “in a room in the rear of the 
New Haven Bank building,” which, in 1839 at least, it was allowed to use rent-free.122 For a 
time, the Board of the Savings Bank conducted meetings in the New Haven Bank’s 
boardroom.123 Although its capital may have come from outside elite circles, the New Haven 
Savings Bank was still managed by the city’s patrician leaders. 
 But the New Haven Savings Bank did differ from its predecessors in the volume and 
socioeconomic composition of its borrowers. Unlike earlier private banks in New Haven and 
even the SBNH, the New Haven Savings Bank lent to a broad population of residents. Moreover, 
its lending practices indicate that it relied on expertise and institutional competence to locate and 
evaluate borrowers, operating as a genuine Row 3 financial intermediary. First, the sheer volume 
of mortgages originated by the Savings Bank would have strained reliance on pre-existing social 
and economic networks in New Haven. In 1844 alone, the Savings Bank made sixty mortgages, 
                                                 
120 See DIRECTORY, supra note 101. 
121 See Passbook, supra note 107. 




an order of magnitude more than any other private bank in a single year. The upward trend in the 
volume of the Bank’s mortgages appears to have continued and accelerated in later years. In 
1847, a few years outside the window of this’s paper’s datasets, the Land Records began to 
accept printed form pages specifically for mortgages originated by the Savings Bank, ostensibly 
because their volume was so large.124 Second, in keeping with developments like printed forms 
and unlike other bank lenders, the Savings Bank’s mortgages were standardized, including 
essentially identical voiding clauses setting semiannual interest payments and making mortgages 
“payable on demand for value received.”125 Unlike the Town and the State, the Savings Bank 
was not constrained by statutory demands in standardizing the terms of its loans. Accordingly, 
the consistency of the voiding clause language across a large volume of mortgages suggests that 
the Bank sold a standardized product, perhaps familiar to its customers over time, and did not 
engage in extensive bargaining with sophisticated mortgagees. Third, the Savings Bank’s 
mortgages were small, $1,100 on average—less than half the size of those made by earlier banks. 
                                                 
124 See Volume 124 in the Land Records; see, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 124, p. 1 of Land Records (Oct. 15, 1847) 
(included in Appendix B). These printed forms were used at least until 1891. See Marshall, supra note 28, at 
Appendix A. 
125 See, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 105, p. 69 of Land Records (Oct. 4, 1841). Some of the Bank’s early loans in 
1838 deviated from this language, and there are exceptions in the record even in later years. For the most part, 
though, the language of the Savings Bank’s mortgage deeds remained constant. The payability-on-demand term is 
puzzling. Taken at face value, it would give the Savings Bank the power to demand repayment of a loan at any time. 
Even given the short-term nature of many of the loans from this period, such a provision would be extreme. See 
supra note 57. In practice, it appears that loans were paid back over a period of years. Using the archives’ indexes, I 
searched for deeds where the Bank was listed as a grantee. I located thirty-one release documents, generally 
quitclaim deeds, recorded before 1844 explicitly releasing mortgagors from obligations to the Bank and renouncing 
Bank claims to mortgaged land. As with the release documents for the Town mortgages, I matched these releases 
with earlier Bank mortgages using the name of the grantee, the date of the original mortgage (if given in the release), 
or the volume and page number of the original mortgage (in some cases this was included in the release document). 
The average length of time between the initial mortgage deed and the associated release was 26 months, implying 
that, in many cases, the Bank did not demand repayment of loans as early as it might have. However, release 
documents may not be valid indications of when loans were repaid. See supra note 100 for a fuller discussion of 
these issues. It is also possible that the language “payable on demand for value received” incorporated more lenient 
repayment terms contained in the promissory note associated with each mortgage. However, a surviving promissory 
note from this period contains no such extra terms and instead repeats the same provision: “On demand, for value 
received, I promise to pay the New Haven Savings Bank, at the office of said Bank, in the city of New Haven, the 
sum of Two Thousand Dollars, with the interest payable semiannually.” Promissory Note, supra note 57 (noting, on 
the reverse side, that principal repayments did not begin for eight years). The legal and economic significance of the 
payability-on-demand terms is discussed in greater depth infra at Section IV.B. 
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The smaller size of the mortgages suggest that they were made to less wealthy borrowers, who 
were less likely to be plugged in to patrician social networks. Finally, many of the Savings 
Bank’s borrowers were identifiably not members of New Haven’s elite, based on their 
occupations as given in the annual city directories. Because so many mortgagors are unlisted in 
the directories, they do not provide a complete picture of the socioeconomic composition of the 
Savings Bank’s borrowers. However, they do confirm that the borrowers included joiners, 
painters, grocers, an African American laborer and various other middle-class folks.126 There 
were upper class, professional borrowers as well: a physician, whom the directories also identify 
as an “instructor in elocution,” and a lawyer.127 By the early 1840s, however, the Savings Bank 
was making more loans every year to carpenters and blacksmiths than the New Haven Bank 
made in a single year to anyone. 
The composition of the Bank’s borrowers, the details of its mortgages, and the way it 
presented itself through materials like its passbooks all show that the Savings Bank operated as 
genuine Row 3 financial intermediary. Unlike the earlier banks that accumulated capital and 
made loans primarily within elite social networks, the Savings Bank had the expertise and 
institutional capabilities to reach beyond existing social structures, attract capital from strangers, 
and allocate capital to strangers. Moreover, operating in this way was profitable for the Savings 
Bank: it grew in size, was still a force in New Haven’s mortgage market in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries,128 and remained in business into the early 2000s before undergoing 
                                                 
126 See Directory, supra note 101. 
127 Id. 
128 See Marshall, supra note 28. 
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a successful merger.129 Its transition into Row 3 of the capital hierarchy was a permanent change 
in the city’s financial development. 
This Part has examined the 1837 shift in New Haven’s mortgage market. During and 
after 1837, mortgages from institutions became broadly accessible to residents of the city who 
were not among its elite. A relatively small number were able to acquire mortgages from the 
Town Deposit Fund in 1837 and, soon thereafter, a greater number took out mortgages from the 
New Haven Savings Bank. While the Town Deposit Fund was a public institution and 
accordingly cannot be categorized within the traditional capital hierarchy, it at least operated like 
a Row 3 institution in that it relied on its institutional capabilities to find borrowers instead of 
pre-existing social networks. The New Haven Savings Bank was the city’s first true Row 3 
financial intermediary: pooling as well as disseminating capital outside of pre-existing social 
structures. However, this discussion of the change in the city’s mortgage market has not 
addressed a central question—and a particularly salient one if any modern lessons are to be 
drawn from New Haven’s nineteenth century experience: why did this change occur? Why did 
the city climb the capital hierarchy in 1837? The next and final Part proposes some answers to 
this question. 
IV. Why Did the Shift in New Haven’s Mortgage Market Occur? 
This Part considers why New Haven’s mortgage market progressed up the capital 
hierarchy when it did. Understanding what drove the changes in the market could provide 
valuable insights into how to promote financial development and economic growth in settings 
besides early nineteenth century New Haven. The following Sections consider, in turn, 
                                                 
129 See MERGER DECISIONS, supra note 30. 
47 
 
economic, legal, and sociopolitical accounts of why the change happened when it did. All of the 
theories discussed in this Part may have some truth to them: history rarely proceeds along 
unicausal lines. 
A. Economic Theories 
1. Macroeconomic Theories 
Macroeconomic conditions may have played a role in the shift in the New Haven 
mortgage market. The early nineteenth century was a period of amazing growth. Between 1800 
and 1850, the city’s population more than tripled, and the number of buildings quadrupled.130 
One account of the shift in the city’s mortgage market might be that it was primarily product of 
this economic growth. However, this is too thin an account to fully explain the change. First, 
New Haven’s economic development during this period unfolded over decades, but the shift in 
the mortgage market happened abruptly. Moreover, the particular moment when the change 
began was an exception to the long-term pattern of growth: the Panic of 1837 was among the 
most severe in American history and began a recession lasting through the mid-1840s.131 Bank 
failures and loan losses were widespread.132 More locally, the New Haven Bank, along with a 
consortium of New York City banks, suspended specie payments for a year in 1837-1838.133 The 
late 1830s and early 1840s would be a counterintuitive time for macroeconomic conditions to 
spur financial development. A second problem with a purely macroeconomic account of the shift 
is that empirical research suggests that the causal process generally runs the other way, with 
                                                 
130 See NEW HAVEN CITY REPORTS 91 (1860-1861) (available at the New Haven Museum). 
131 See Rousseau, supra note 103. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; see Record Book, supra note 47. Banknotes at the time were backed by “specie,” usually commodities like 
gold or silver, which holders could demand from any bank honoring the notes. 
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financial development supporting economic growth.134 The city’s growth, particularly after 1837, 
was more likely a consequence of its progress up the capital hierarchy instead of a cause. 
Moreover, economic research has documented situations where significantly higher levels of 
economic development and complexity than those present in 1830s New Haven nonetheless did 
not lead to a shift from Row 2 to Row 3.135 In sum, then, while the general trend of economic 
expansion in the nineteenth century may have contributed to the city’s financial development, it 
does not sufficiently explain the discrete shift in the market. 
2. Microeconomic Theories 
A microeconomic perspective on the shift may do a better job of explaining it. Drawing 
on the theories of Ronald Coase in the Nature of the Firm, one might expect Row 3 lenders to 
appear and make smaller, broader mortgage loans when the costs of a firm doing so are less than 
the costs of Row 2 individuals and firms making the same loans.136 Genuine Row 3 financial 
intermediaries may be able to take advantage of lower marginal costs in pooling capital, locating 
and evaluating mortgagees, and spreading risk. Thus, a microeconomic account would argue that 
the New Haven Savings Bank appeared when it did because, with its passbooks and form 
mortgages, it was able to lower the transaction costs of making mortgages in New Haven, 
capture some of this cost reduction, and thereby sustain itself as an institution. This would also 
explain why the Bank was successful over a long period of time, even when Row 2 capital 
sources were still available. 
                                                 
134 See supra note 1. 
135 See, e.g., Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, Connections, and the 
Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 535 (2009) (documenting “connected” lending in 
Vietnam); Rafael La Porta et al., Related Lending, 118 Q. J. ECON. 231, 233 (2003) (documenting the prevalence of 
related lending, similar to insider lending, in modern Mexico and listing twenty-four other countries where banks are 
controlled by entities with substantial non-financial interests).  
136 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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The microeconomic explanation is parsimonious and coherent, but, with respect to the 
timing of the Bank’s appearance, it leaves something to be desired. For this simple version of the 
theory to explain the sudden rise of Row 3 lending after 1837, the relative costs of individual and 
institutional lending must have changed abruptly. This defect is particularly striking because 
there were other active financial institutions in existence before 1837 that could have operated as 
genuine Row 3 intermediaries. New firms must pay up-front costs to form and become active in 
a market. But existing firms may have already recouped these expenditures and accordingly will 
have even lower transaction costs than new firms. Thus, if lower costs for lending by firms fully 
explained the appearance of Row 3 lending, then the New Haven Bank or some other existing, 
profit-maximizing firm would have shifted into broader mortgage lending practices over time. 
This is not a fatal flaw of the microeconomic account, but it does lead to a corollary question: 
what changed in 1837 that sufficiently shifted the economic calculations for institutional lending 
to justify the formation of a new firm and a novel project of small bank loans to a diverse group 
of borrowers? 
B. Legal Changes 
Legal developments can bring about changed economic circumstances. They are 
particularly important to consider in the development context because they point to discrete 
reforms jurisdictions might make to promote development. This Section considers two types of 
legal developments that could have changed the economic calculations behind Row 3 lending in 
New Haven in the 1830s. However, legal changes do not seem to be the source of the changed 
circumstances driving the rise of Row 3 lending. In particular, there do not seem to be relevant, 
specific changes that occurred before the shift. 
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First, changes in incorporation laws could have lowered the costs associated with forming 
a genuine Row 3 intermediary. This would place New Haven in line with New York State and its 
turn to free banking laws in 1838, which reduced the legal barriers to entering New York’s 
banking market.137 However, Connecticut did not embrace free banking. Indeed, in 1838, it 
added to the statute setting out the procedural steps necessary to petition the General Assembly 
for a bank charter.138 Moreover, although Connecticut had these process requirements on its 
books, it and the rest of New England had established a de facto free banking system early in the 
1810s and 1820s, essentially granting bank charters to all petitioners who followed the statutory 
procedures.139 There simply were not any developments in incorporation laws that would have 
changed the entry costs for a new Row 3 financial intermediary in the late 1830s. 
Second, it is possible that changes in contract or real property law precipitated the shift in 
the mortgage market. In particular, the standardized terms of the New Haven Savings Bank’s 
mortgages may have included some drafting innovation or term previously disallowed by law 
that substantially lowered its costs. The most likely such term would the provision making its 
loans “payable on demand.” Particularly given Connecticut’s usury laws, which capped interest 
rates at 6 percent, it may have been valuable to make loans immediately payable on demand.140 
However, there do not seem to have been observable, relevant changes in property or contract 
law during this period. Mortgages with “payable on demand” provisions were made between 
private individuals and recognized by courts many years before 1837.141 Connecticut’s mortgage 
                                                 
137 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at ch. 8. 
138 An Act in addition to an Act entitled “an Act concerning Petitions and Memorials to the General Assembly,” 
1839 Conn. Pub. Acts 326. 
139 See BODENHORN, supra note 10, at 78; Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley’s Question, supra note 10, at 111 (“[New 
England states] had established de facto free entry in banking in the 1810s and 1820s.”). 
140 See BODENHORN, supra note 11, at 147 tbl.4.5. 
141 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Wheaton, 9 Conn. 96 (Conn. 1831). 
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case law at the time seemed primarily concerned with notice-giving requirements and not with 
adjustments that have might accommodated new institutional lenders.142  
Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the “payable on demand” provisions of 
the Savings Bank’s mortgages were not consistently enforced. It is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions on this point because the Land Records contain release documents for only a portion 
of the Bank’s mortgage deeds.143 However, thirty-one deeds explicitly releasing mortgagors from 
obligations to the Bank and renouncing Bank claims to mortgaged land were recorded before 
1844.144 The length of time between an initial mortgage deed and a release varied considerably 
but averaged twenty-six months.145 Thus, for at least a non-trivial portion of its mortgages, the 
Bank appears to have allowed its mortgagors some flexibility in the practical terms of their 
loans.146 This is not to say that the Bank never foreclosed on its mortgagors.147 However, when it 
did foreclose, it had to follow the same foreclosure procedures as any other lender: a deed of sale 
recorded in 1841 relates how the Bank sought a foreclosure decree for the land in question and 
waited for the duration of a redemption period before taking title. 148 Overall, then, the legal 
details and context of the Bank’s operations offer little explanation for why it appeared when it 
did. Explanatory shifts in corporation, contracting, or real property law are not apparent. 
C.  The Town and the Bank: A Sociopolitical Story 
                                                 
142 For a sample of representative mortgages cases from this period, see Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215 (Conn. 
1830); Stoughton v. Pasco and Pasco, 5 Conn. 442 (Conn. 1825); Sanford v. Wheeler, 13 Conn. 165 (Conn. 1839). 
143 See supra notes 100 and 125. Note that release documents may not be a good indication of repayment periods. 
144 See supra note 125. 
145 Id. 
146 But see supra note 100 (explaining why deeds releasing mortgagor from obligations may have been recorded 
later than repayment of associated loans). 
147 See, e.g., Deed of Sale at Vol. 104, p. 178 (describing how the bank foreclosed on the property at issue). 
148 Id. (“[S]aid land and buildings hereby conveyed are the same premises which were mortgaged to the said New 
Haven Savings Bank . . . by deed dated July 15th 1839 and on which said New Haven Savings Bank attained a 
decree of foreclosure from the Superior Court for the County of New Haven at its terms for January 1841 . . . and 
the time limited by said Court for the redemption of said premises by all said parties has expired.”). 
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Although legal changes do not appear to have caused the shift in the market, there was 
one statutory development that had a direct effect on institutional lending in New Haven: the 
creation of the Town Deposit Fund. The proximity of the activities of the New Haven Town 
Deposit Fund to the rise of the New Haven Savings Bank suggests a final theory for the shift in 
the mortgage market. This theory takes the microeconomic account of the formation of Row 3 
financial intermediaries as given and accepts that the Savings Bank formed and was successful 
because it had lower marginal costs of pooling capital, locating and evaluating mortgagees, and 
spreading risk. But, before 1837, the relative efficiency of a Row 3 institution like the Savings 
Bank might not have been known to the banks operating in the city. Although smaller mortgages 
to non-elite individuals during this period were profitable—as demonstrated by the existence of 
mortgages between individuals and the later success of the New Haven Savings Bank—patrician 
banks may not have made such mortgages because they gathered information primarily through 
closed, elite networks that had no way of assembling this knowledge. Without any institution 
compiling the knowledge of profitability in a single place, it must have been dispersed across a 
volume of individual-to-individual loans throughout the city, many of them between individuals 
with whom the patrician banks probably did not communicate. The very tools used by the Row 2 
banks to efficiently evaluate borrowers—pre-existing social status and wealth—made them 
institutionally blind to downmarket opportunities. 
The reason the market shifted in 1837, then, may be because the Town solved this 
information problem by demonstrating the demand for and viability of Row 3 lending. The 
Connecticut statute disbursing the federal surplus called for town meetings to appoint a manager 
for each Town Deposit Fund. The manager’s appointment and his work were subject to the 
deliberative will of the community. It is possible, then, that the Town overcame the information 
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barrier in the market simply by asking townspeople what they wanted to use the influx of capital 
for and then following their instructions. By creating a political forum where economic actors 
who were not plugged into pre-existing elite social networks could publicly present and assemble 
privately held knowledge, the Town performed an information-aggregating service with 
economically significant results. In addition to the social barriers the Town overcame, it may 
also have performed a service in purely economic terms. The evidence of the profitability of 
downmarket loans may have existed in the New Haven Land Records for some time in the form 
of mortgage deeds between private individuals. But, in an anti-Hayekian moment, the 
information may have been too atomized to be useful until the Town made it legible through a 
public forum and subsequent public action.149 
This theory has several flaws. The first of which is a lack of direct evidence shedding 
light on the town meetings creating the Deposit Fund or on the Fund’s activities in selecting 
borrowers. The New Haven Clerk’s office contains extensive handwritten notes from several of 
New Haven’s municipal government bodies at the time, including the City’s Board of Alderman 
and Court of Common Council. However, the archives of the Town’s governing body, the Board 
of Selectmen, are missing volumes covering several early decades of the nineteenth century.150 
In particular, no record of the Town’s political decisionmaking in 1837 appears to exist. While 
this absence of evidence is not a direct counterargument to the sociopolitical account of the 1837 
shift, it does point out how much weight such a theory places on the simple proximity of the 
Town Deposit Fund to the formation of the New Haven Savings Bank. Without direct evidence 
                                                 
149 Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 4 AMER. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
150 Records exist for meetings of the Board of Selectmen from 1771 to 1819 and again from 1863 onwards. It is an 
unfortunate coincidence for this paper that the Town Deposit Fund was administered during a period for which the 
minutes of the meetings of the Board of Selectmen are unavailable. 
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that townspeople had real input into the creation and activities of the Town Deposit Fund, the 
link between the Fund and the wider changes in the market must remain speculative. 
A related and more substantive criticism of the sociopolitical account would push back 
on the idea that demand for downmarket mortgages was so atomized that private lenders could 
not put the information to use on their own, without the intervention of a government-backed 
Town Deposit Fund. Individual lenders were ostensibly earning above-market returns on their 
mortgages to individual borrowers. What if they came together to create an institutional lender to 
capture more of these profits? While this critique makes sense in terms of the theoretical 
incentives of the relevant economic actors, it suffers from a few defects. First, like a pure 
microeconomic theory explaining the New Haven Savings Bank as a more efficient mortgage 
lender, a story of spontaneous organization by individual lenders in New Haven begs the 
question of why the Bank appeared when it did. Individual mortgage lenders had been profitably 
making mortgage loans in New Haven for many years before the late 1830s—what would move 
them to act on their knowledge and form a bank in the teeth of a bitter depression? Second, the 
counterexample of existing private lenders coming together to create an institutional lender does 
not line up with the historical record. The New Haven Savings Bank was founded and operated 
by members of the patrician elite who were likely socially disconnected from at least a 
significant portion of the individual borrowers and lenders in the city. The Bank’s formation was 
not the result of bottom-up economic knowledge and financial incentives guiding the efforts of 
entrepreneurs. The Bank was created because something caught the attention of the primary 
holders of social and economic capital in New Haven and convinced them that it was time to 
deploy their capital downwards. The innovative lending practices of the Town Deposit Fund may 
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seem far-fetched as a source of inspiration for the likes of James Brewster and Ralph Ingersoll, 
but, particularly in the absence of alternatives, they are a plausible catalyst. 
A final criticism of the sociopolitical account is simply that it is incomplete. The theory 
cannot stand on its own. The Town may have served as an information gate, providing a public 
forum for aggregating information and demonstrating its accuracy through profitable loans. But 
this would have counted for little if the wider economic conditions in New Haven had not been 
right or if the New Haven Savings Bank had been legally or organizationally incapable of 
capitalizing on the information. Most importantly, the activities of the Fund alone would 
probably not have shifted the lending practices of the patrician leaders of the New Haven 
Savings Bank if they had not been prepared for some change already. The background 
sociopolitical dynamics in New Haven must have played an important role. In particular, the 
sociopolitical account rests on the assumption that a town meeting could adequately assemble 
dispersed community knowledge of downmarket demand and profitability. If patricians had 
totally dominated the town’s political scene, the relevant information about the lower segment of 
the mortgage market might not have been heard. However, the assumption that the town’s 
political institutions allowed middle-class voices to be heard—particularly upwardly mobile 
middle-class voices asking for mortgages—is not unreasonable. At the time, New Haven was on 
the cusp of significant social change. Economic and social leadership was slowly shifting from 
the patrician elite to a new group of more self-made strivers. Robert Dahl identifies the election 
of P.S. Galpin in 1842 as the moment when political leadership shifted between these two 
groups.151 If the Young Turks of New Haven could capture the mayor’s office in 1842, then they 
                                                 
151 See DAHL, supra note 116, tbl.2.1. 
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may very well have been able to influence the creation and activities of the Town Deposit Fund 
five years earlier. 
Alongside the wider social changes taking place in the city, the statute creating the Town 
Deposit Fund also deserves credit for ensuring that citizens outside the patrician elite had some 
say in how the federal surplus funds were ultimately allocated. Had the statute simply placed the 
Fund under the control of the New Haven mayor in 1837, H.C. Flagg, a patrician lawyer, the 
Fund might not have been able to serve the same information-aggregating purpose.152 
Accordingly, the statute can be seen as an early and successful example of federalism-all-the-
way-down through its empowerment of a local population that had not yet won outright political 
control of the city.153 From this perspective, the sociopolitical account offers some policy 
guidance for modern governments seeking to promote financial development. In particular, it 
suggests that modern governments might embrace robustly decentralized models of economic 
action to solve information gaps in local markets. It also highlights how unregulated local 
markets may have particular information problems that require public action. However, the 
sociopolitical account does not call for sustained or large-scale government intervention in 
markets. Instead, it recommends government action on a local scale to assemble information that 
would otherwise be too diffuse or buried in the community to be economically useful. The real 
lesson of the shift in New Haven’s mortgage market may be the value of small-scale legibility 
produced by local political structures.154 
                                                 
152 Id. 
153 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 23-25 (2010). 
154 For an extended discussion of how governments produce legibility (and the negative consequences that can 
result), see generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
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Overall, the sociopolitical account has strengths and weaknesses and is likely only a 
partial explanation for the changes in the city’s mortgage market. However, one final advantage 
of the theory is that it may be testable. The statute creating the Town Deposit Fund authorized 
and financed similar Funds in municipalities across Connecticut. These towns, like New Haven, 
kept land records. It would be possible to recreate the methodology of this paper in other cities, 
such as Hartford and Bridgeport. If the federal surplus funds were distributed in similar ways in 
other municipalities, further research could determine if similar shifts occurred in other local 
mortgage markets. Moreover, cities in other New England states like Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts could be included in the sample. Lamoreaux and Bodenhorn have documented 
extensive similarities between the nineteenth century financial systems of these states.155 But 
each state did not spend its share of the federal surplus in the same way. The financial markets of 
towns with active Deposit Funds could be compared with the outcomes of towns in neighboring 
states that lacked Deposit Funds. Further research along these lines could provide more 
compelling evidence that the Town Deposit Fund played a significant role in New Haven’s 




This paper has taken a detailed look at New Haven’s progression up the capital hierarchy. 
It has no illusions that the experience of a mid-sized Connecticut city in the early nineteenth 
century will be comprehensively representative of economic development in other times and 
                                                 
155 See BODENHORN, supra note 10 at ch. 4; LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, at ch. 3. 
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places. However, the city’s mortgage market did undergo a change in the late 1830s that is 
crucial for complex, sustained economic growth—namely the transition from capital allocation 
through pre-existing social networks to capital allocation through institutional expertise. This 
transition was not inevitable, and this paper has proposed several theories for why it happened 
when it did. In focusing particularly on the activities of the Town Deposit Fund, it has sought to 
develop a new perspective on how local political institutions can shape economic development. 
Ultimately, markets are powerful, but fragile, institutions, and historical and sociopolitical 












Volume Occupation as stated in 1840 directory 
04/07/1837 John Anderson $400 92 472 listed without occupation 
04/06/1837 Elihu Atwater $1,000 92 469 Joiner 
02/17/1837 Stephen Bishop $1,000 92 348 dealer in paints and groceries 
01/26/1837 Ezekiel Chidsey $1,000 92 321 boot and shoe store  
01/26/1837 Beriah Bradley $1,000 92 325 boot and shoe store  
01/26/1837 George Bradley $400 92 326 blacksmith 
04/06/1837 Oliver Bryan $1,000 92 471 merchant tailor 
02/09/1837 Hannah Carr $850 92 330 unlisted 
04/05/1837 
Charles B. Linus and Abel 
Chamberlain $500 92 464 unlisted; cabinet manufacturer 
04/22/1837 John Durrie $1,000 92 543 booksellers & publishers 
01/31/1837 Mary Foster $500 92 328 listed without occupation 
04/06/1837 Luther Gilbert $930 92 465 livery stable 
04/06/1837 Eliazer Gorham $750 92 454 boot and shoe store  
04/05/1837 Marcus Merriman $500 92 466 Senator (State) 
03/15/1837 Rhodolphus Northrop $1,000 92 423 carver 
04/06/1837 
James Parker; James Parker 
Jr. $1,000 92 470 livery stable 
01/31/1837 Asahel Pierpont $1,000 92 329 
door lock and latch manufacturer (with 
Hotchkiss) 
04/14/1837 Samuel Rowland $750 92 492 listed without occupation 
01/30/1837 Anna Whittlsey $1,000 92 327 unlisted 
04/07/1837 John Mitchell $1,000 92 467 listed without occupation 
04/07/1837 John Mitchell $1,000 92 468 listed without occupation 
02/09/1837 Washington School District $500 93 29 School District 
07/12/1837 Chauncey Wells $250 95 237 joiner 
07/05/1837 Alexander Stover $1,000 95 222 unlisted 
06/06/1837 Minott Osborn $750 95 227 
printers and publishers of Columbian Register 
(with Baldwin) 
06/06/1837 Charles Monson $1,000 95 226 
store 2 Elm c York, factory Whitney Avenue c 
First, h 4 Elm 
06/05/1837 Joel Hartshon $400 95 221 shoe maker 
07/05/1837 Samuel Bassett $1,000 95 223 
unlisted (although S.M. Bassett has a looking 
glass manufactory) 
07/22/1837 Treat Botsford $500 95 264 marble and stone yard 
07/05/1837 Daniel Brown $1,000 95 224 builder 
07/20/1837 Judson Curtiss $750 95 258 joiner 
07/07/1837 Anson Colt $1,000 95 232 unlisted 
07/10/1837 Abigail Bishop $1,000 95 233 unlisted 
11/28/1837 Anson Colt $1,000 95 472 unlisted 
07/18/1837 Stephen Cooke $750 95 252 unlisted 
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